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Abstract—The Urban Rail Transit (URT) has been one of
the major trip modes in cities worldwide. As the passengers
arrive at variable rates in different time slots, e.g., rush and
non-rush hours, the departure frequency at a site directly
relates to perceived service quality of passengers; the high
departure frequency, however, incurs more operation cost to URT.
Therefore, a tradeoff between the interest of railway operator
and the service quality of passengers needs to be addressed.
In this paper, we develop a model on the operation method
of train operation scheduling using a Stackelberg game model.
The railway operator is modeled as the game leader and the
passengers as the game follower, and an optimal departure
frequency can be determine the tradeoff between passengers’
service quality and operation cost. We present several numerical
examples based on the operation data from Nanjing transit
subway at China. The results demonstrate that the proposed
model can significantly improve the traffic efficiency.
Index Terms—Stackelberg game, Urban Rail Transit, Depar-
ture frequency, Optimization
I. INTRODUCTION
The world has witnessed great development and rapid im-
provement of urban rail transit (URT) due to its convenience,
safety, comfort, vast capacity and high energy efficiency. In
China, for example, 88 urban rail lines had been built with over
3000 kilometers of track operation by the end of 2014. Another
1400 kilometers had been added with a total investment of
$170 billion USD by 2015 [1]. It is foreseeable that in
the forthcoming future, the modern urban rail transit system
will be the backbone transportation system in the large and
medium-size cities.
With increasing people relying on the subway as their
commutes in cities, challenges are imposed on the service
operators of URT to maintain an acceptable or satisfying level
of quality of experience (QoE) [2, 3]. Taking the departure
frequency as an example, the passengers prefer frequent train
arrivals to reduce the waiting time and more spare seats on
trains. Passengers, especially from outskirts suburbs, prefer
direct line routes with minimal intermediate stops to minimize
their trip time. In cases where the demand for transit service
is elastic, shorter routes, and thus higher access impedance,
might decrease service attractiveness and drive commuters to
adopt other travel methods. On the other hand, the cost or
interest restriction of operators cannot be ignored. To limit
the cost of operation, the operators prefer to a low departure
frequency and shorter line routes. Therefore, service operator
and passengers have conflicting objectives [4].
Apparently, the effective approach to the conflict is to search
for the balance between the passengers and operators’ interests
or demands and design an adaptive and optimized operation
mechanism. Supported by the advanced wireless communi-
cation technology [5-7], multi-level information awareness
becomes available. By way of example, with the use of
wireless sensor networks [8-10], the passengers counts, the
travel time and the load in the vehicle are accessible.
Based on the advanced technology, we introduce a Stackel-
berg game model [11-13] to address the conflict of interests.
In the game, two parties influence each other involved with
their own strategies and interests; therefore, one party adjusts
its own combat strategy making use of the other’s strategy to
achieve the goal. The input of the game model is the benefit
expressions of both parties. The output of the game mode is the
optimal departure frequency with the interests of both parties
addressed. The main contributions of our work are summarized
as follows:
• Mathematical modeling: we derive the benefit expres-
sions of the service operator and passengers. As for
the former, we take the difference between income and
spending as its benefit, which is involved with the subway
fares, energy-consuming cost, maintenance cost, workers’
wages and depreciation cost, etc. The waiting time cost
and traveling comfort are considered to evaluate the
passengers’ benefit;
• Game theoretic solution: different from the existing ap-
proaches, we introduce the game theory to model the
dynamic decision-making process of departure frequency
to obtain the balanced value;
• Simulations: we conduct extensive simulations to verify
the efficiency of our approach. By comparing our ap-
proach with previous literature, we show that our proposal
can achieve much better performance.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
describes an overview of the decision making and train oper-
ation adjustment of urban rail transit. The system model and
problem formation is presented in Section III. In Section IV,
the Stackelberg model is solved and proved. Then, numerical
experiments are conducted in Section V. Finally, the paper
concludes with Section VI.
II. RELATED WORKS
In order to maintain a satisfying level of quality of
experience, optimization models have been widely adopted to
determine the optimal Urban rail transit (URT) train operation
with different objectives, such as travel time [14], waiting
time [15], operation cost [16-18] and robustness [19].
Amit et al. [20] apply optimization techniques to solve
train timetable optimization problems. Ghoseiri et al. [21]
present a multi-objective optimization model for the passenger
train scheduling problem on a railroad network. To adjust
the arrival/departure times of trains based on a dynamic
behavior of demand, Canca et al. [22] develop a nonlinear
integer programming model, which can be used to evaluate
the train service quality. Considering the user satisfaction
parameters, average travel time and energy consumption, Sun
et al. [23] present a multi-objective optimization model of
the train routing problem. Wang et al. [24, 25] propose a
real-time train scheduling model with stop-skipping and solve
the problem with the mixed integer nonlinear programming
(MINLP) approach and the mixed integer linear programming
(MILP) approach. Sun et al. [26] propose an optimization
method of train scheduling for metro lines with a train dwell
time mode, and lagrangian duality theory is adopted to solve
this optimization problem with high dimensionality.
To our knowledge, for most of the optimization models of
train scheduling, their planning objectives are constructed from
the perspective of the passengers and operator such as train
delays and operation cost. However, the previous literature
does not consider the complicated interactions between pas-
sengers and operator. This paper makes a contribution towards
solving this problem by introducing game theoretic model to
this optimization problem.
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMATION
This section first justifies assumptions used, and then
analyzes the interplays between the railway operator and pas-
sengers. Lastly, a Stackelberg game formulation is developed
for the optimization problem of operation mechanism.
A. Assumptions
Urban rail transit system is complicated. To develop an
optimization model of the operation mechanism, we first
present and justify some assumptions used in the work:
• Failures and accidents will not occur. This is a valid
assumption as accidents are now very rare in modern URT
system.
• The flat fare is applied. This means passengers are
charged the same fee regardless of the length of the trip,
delay or type of service. The assumption can be easily
extended to consider trips of different classes and fare
rates.
• Passengers’ arrival rate changes with the departure fre-
quency. This is a working assumption as an increasing
departure frequency typically attracts more passengers,
and the arrival rate of passengers would increase accord-
ingly;
• With new Advanced Public Transportation System tech-
nologies (e.g., automatic passenger counters), passengers’
arrival rate over stations and time are given or predictable.
The estimation of passenger’s arrival rate has been an
active research problem with many research works de-
veloped. Due to the limited space, this paper will not
consider the estimation of passenger’s arrival rate and
assume it known.
B. System Model
As presented above, there is a tradeoff between the oper-
ator’s and passengers’ interests. The passengers would prefer
frequent train departures of spare seats and short waiting
time. However, the operator targets to high revenue and low
operation cost and would control the departure frequency.
Consequently, in order to alleviate the perceived conflict
between passengers and operator objectives, it is essential and
feasible to seek the balance between the two sides’ interests.
In this paper, a Stackelberg game model is adopted to capture
the tradeoff.
In our work, a Stackelberg game with two kinds of players,
leaders and followers, is applied into the optimization problem
of URT operation mechanism. The leaders have the privilege
of acting first and then the followers act according to the
leaders’ actions sequentially; the players compete on resources
to profit in this game by maximizing their own utilities.
In the developed game, the railway operator is the leader
and the passengers will follow with correspondent strategies.
In specific, as for the adjusting behavior of departure fre-
quency, the operator first imposes a departure frequency s1
from a set S1 according to the traditional method and its
cost constraints. Then, informed of the operator’s choice,
the passengers choose a best budget expenditure on fare s2
from a set S2. In the meantime, the passengers plan their
travel routes (which leads to the fluctuation of passenger
traffic) according to the predictable travel experience under the
current frequency. After observing the response of passengers,
the operator readjusts the departure frequency, the former of
which can be regarded as a disguised feedback to operator’s
service. After a continuous adjusting process, the frequency
is determined finally. In this process, supervision by public
opinion plays an important role who compels the operator to
adjust the departure frequency and fare to an appropriate value.
C. Problem Formulation
In this paper, we consider train operates on a unidirectional
urban transit line with m stations as shown in Fig. 1, for
bidirectional line can be regarded as two unidirectional lines
in our scheme. The stations are numbered as 1, 2, ..., m,
where station 1 is the origin station and station m is the
destination of each trip. Without loss of generality, we assume
that the passengers’ arrival at these stations follow Poisson
distribution. Trains depart from station 1 to station m in the
direction of travel.
Origin Destination
1 1i - i 1i + m
Direction of travel
Station
Rail transit line
Legend:
Fig. 1: Illustration of a rail transit line. For one transit line,
we set up a procedure to obtain the optimization of departure
frequency of trains based on the total entrance of passengers
into of each station.
TABLE I: Important Notations
Notation Meaning
i station index, i = 1, 2, ...,m
λi passenger arrival rate at station i
f departure frequency (per hour)
h operating headway for a transit route
Ω one-way energy consumption of each train
S0 daily maintenance cost of each train
R staffs’ hourly wage cost
T duration of studied period
φ depreciation cost of each train
Tp one-way travel time of each train
TS daily operating time of train
θ rated load factor of train
p passenger capacity of each carriage
Based on the scene description above, the utility functions of
railway operator and passengers will be analyzed hereinafter.
1) Utility Function of Railway Operator (Leader): Un-
doubtedly, the railway operator would like to pursue the
greater benefit under the condition that the passengers’ basic
demands are satisfied. Hence, it is necessary to establish the
utility function of operator.
In this paper, we take the difference between income and
operation cost as the benefit. For simplicity, we only take
the fare revenue as the operator’s income regardless of the
advertising revenue, rental income and so on. The income of
operator can be expressed as fare c multiplied by the total
passenger traffic Q′ as (1). The actual total passenger traffic
Q
′ is influenced by fare c and departure frequency f . The
impact factors of c and f are ec and ef , respectively. The
increase of fare c leads to the reduction of passenger traffic
while the increase of frequency may attract more passengers.
I= cQ
′
= cQ (1− ecc+ eff) . (1)
The operation cost consist of fixed cost (such as construction
cost, labor cost, etc) and variable cost. Considering that the
fixed cost do not change along the departure times, we neglect
this part of cost. The variable cost we considered include
energy-consuming cost, maintenance cost and depreciation
cost, etc. Energy consuming cost can be calculated as ΩTf .
Here Ω is the energy consumption of each train for one trip, T
is duration of the studied period, and f is departure frequency.
Maintenance cost and depreciation cost can be calculated by
2Tpf
(
φ+RT + S0
T
TS
)
. The total operation cost is
O = ΩTf + 2Tpf
(
φ+RT + S0
T
TS
)
. (2)
We define the utility function of railway operator as
Ul =I −O. (3)
To maximize the net income of railway operator, we for-
mulate the optimization problem of operator as follows:
max
f,c
Ul
s.t. θ0<θ < 1
fmin<f < fmax.
(4)
The operation of rail transit system needs to satisfy the
demand of passengers as well as the operation efficiency.
For a given rail transit system, θ donates the load factor of
train, which reflects the utilization of the maximum capacity.
θ should satisfy θ0<θ < 1 and can be formulated as
θ=
Q
′
C
=
Q
′
f × l × p
, (5)
in which C means the capacity of the rail transit system. l is
the number of carriages on one train, and p is the maximum
carriage capacity of each carriage. θ0 is the minimum load
factor that operator can accept. θ is set to be 0-100%. When
θ equals to 1, it means that the congestion of the carriage
reaches the maximum, and this is intolerable. When θ is
close to 0, it means that the carriage is very empty, and the
transport resources are wasted. To achieve higher operation
efficiency, θ must be within an appropriate range. fmin and
fmax are the minimal and maximal departure frequency of
train, respectively. To ensure driving safety, the maximal
frequency can be calculated based on the speed limited, grade
profiles and train dynamics. The minimal frequency depends
on passengers’ demand.
2) Utility Function of Passengers (Follower): Passengers
benefit from accessing the traveling service provided by rail-
way operator, and pay the operator fare. Given the departure
frequency f , passengers would determine the fare they are
willing to pay for their received service, by considering both
the gained QoE and incurred expense. The utility of passengers
has the following characteristic:
• The utility of passengers is a concave function of the fare
c. It means that there exits a optimum value c∗ which
satisfies: when c is less than c∗, the utility of passengers
is an increasing value of c; when c is greater than c∗, the
utility of passengers is an decreasing value of c.
• Passengers prefer greater departure frequency. The
greater the f is, the lager the passengers’ utility will be.
In order to capture the concave property of utility function,
we define its extreme point as f
2α
, which increases with the
departure frequency. By the analysis above, we define a utility
function for passengers as
Uf = cf − αc
2, (6)
in which α is a positive constant.
Then the mathematical description of optimization problem
for passengers is as follows:
max
f,c
Uf
s.t. fmin < f < fmax.
(7)
IV. STACKELBERG GAME APPROACH
We first analyze the Stackelberg game process and obtain
the closed form solutions to the game outcomes. On this basis,
we will further prove the solution is the unique Stackelberg
equilibrium.
A. Stackelberg Game Process
As discussed above, the operator determines the departure
frequency, while the passengers choose the fare they are
willing to pay and replan their travel routes. We model our
problem as a Stackelberg game. The solution of the Stackel-
berg game is obtained using backward induction.
Given the players’ feasible strategy and their utility function
defined in (4) and (7), the game is played according to the
following sequence.
1) Operator first sets its strategy: First, the operator de-
termines an initial departure frequency according to its cost
constraints.
2) Passengers choose the best response: In the second
stage, passengers know the decision of departure frequency
made by operator. In order to improve their quality of experi-
ence (QoE), passengers make the best response to maximize
their utility. Considering Uf as function in c, we strive for the
second order derivative l (c) of (4) as
l (c) =
∂2Uf
∂c2
= −2α < 0. (8)
Since it is negative, it can be calculated directly that the
utility of passengers is concave with a unique maximum. Then
the first order derivative h (c) can be computed as
h (c) =
∂Uf
∂c
= f − 2αc, (9)
Given the departure frequency f , and let h (c) = 0, we can
get
∂Uf
∂c
= f − 2αc = 0. (10)
Solving (10) for the unknown c, we have the best response
of passengers
c∗ = c (f) . (11)
3) Operator resets its strategy based on the best response
of passengers : As a leader, the railway operator is aware of
the fact that the passengers will choose their best response to
its strategy. The operator tries to maximize its utility based on
the best response of passengers. Substituting the best response
c∗ into (4), we can get the maximum operator’s utility by
max
f,c
Ul = c
∗Q (1− ecc
∗ + eff)−Bf, (12)
in which
B=ΩT + 2Tp
(
φ+RT + S0
T
TS
)
. (13)
Then the problem boils down to solving the maximum value
of (12). We take the partial derivative of f , and let it be 0, as
follows:
∂Ul
∂f
=
∂
∂f
[c∗Q (1− ecc
∗ + eff)−Bf ] = 0. (14)
We can get the expression of f∗ from (14). f∗ is the
most optimal solution to operator’s departure frequency, which
cannot only reduce the operating cost, but also provide higher-
level quality of experience.
B. Stackelberg Equilibrium
In this section, the Stackelberg equilibrium of the game is
defined. In addition, the solution c∗ of (14) and the solution f∗
of (17) is proved to be Stackelberg equilibrium of this game.
Defination: Let f∗ be a solution for (4) and c∗ is a solution
for (7). For any (f, c), which satisfies f ≥ 0 and c ≥ 0, the
point (f∗, c∗) is the Stackelberg equilibrium of this game if
the following conditions are met:
Ul (f
∗, c∗) ≥ Ul (f, c) (15)
Uf (f
∗, c∗) ≥ Uf (f, c) (16)
Theorem: There exits a unique Stackelberg equilibrium for
the optimization mechanism proposed in this paper after a
limited number of iterations.
Proof: The Stackelberg equilibrium can be deduced by
using backward induction. Firstly, we prove the existence
of Stackelberg equilibrium for the passengers (follower). In
the second stage of the game, with the announced strategy
of the railway operator (leader), the passengers choose the
best response strategy (the fare they can afford the service)
according to (11) so as to maximize Uf . According to (6), we
can know that Uf is a strictly concave function of c, as the
second order derivative U ′′f = −2α < 0 where α > 0. Thus,
the decision made by passengers has a unique solution, with
an offered departure frequency f .
Secondly, we prove the the existence of Stackelberg equi-
librium for the railway operator (leader). Since the operator
is aware of the decision made by passengers in the second
stage according to Stackelberg game theroy, we first discuss
the decision made by the passengers. As discussed above, with
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a given frequency f , passengers determine the fare c they wish
based on the following equation
∂Uf
∂c
= 0, (17)
the best response strategy made by passengers is described as
c∗ = min
{
f
2α
, cmax
}
. (18)
With the information of c∗, we can rewrite the utility of
operator Ul as
Ul = c
∗ (1− ecc
∗ + eff)−Bf. (19)
According to (3), we get the second derivation U ′′l ≤ 0.
Hence, Ul is is strictly convex with respect to f . Thus, there
exists a unique Stackelberg equilibrium.
V. NUMERICAL EXPERIMENTS
This section evaluates the performance of the proposed
Stackelberg-based optimization method with MATLAB. The
tool of data processing we used is statistical product and
service solutions (SPSS), which is widely used for statistical
analysis, data management and data document.
A. Data Statistics and Analysis
The numerical simulations are based on the data from
Nanjing Metro. We extract the passenger traffic data of one rail
line at different time of the day (every hour is divided as one
time terminal throughout the running time of Nanjing transit
subway), and we adopt the data of ten days (data of the second
quarter of 2010), part of which is shown in Table II. Based on
the traffic data of all the stations, we can get the passengers
arrival rate curve, which is one of the input parameters of the
game model.
The total passengers traffic can be calculated as
Q =
m∑
i=1
t2∫
t1
λi (t) dt, (20)
where λi (t) is passenger arrival rate at the station i.
TABLE II: Passenger Traffic Examples
Times Interval nin nout Times Interval nin nout
05:00-06:00 1138 47 14:00-15:00 26235 26875
06:00-07:00 7893 4316 15:00-16:00 26672 25052
07:00-08:00 19080 15105 16:00-17:00 28379 25499
08:00-09:00 25993 28353 17:00-18:00 32113 28961
09:00-10:00 24706 27040 18:00-19:00 25217 27842
10:00-11:00 23736 26265 19:00-19:00 17624 18203
11:00-12:00 23045 24807 20:00-21:00 18471 15594
12:00-13:00 23168 23429 21:00-22:00 16579 14945
13:00-14:00 25820 25554 22:00-23:00 10543 11228
B. Simulation Set-up and Performance Analysis
According to the train characteristics of the Nanjing Metro
Line 1, the capacity of each train is 1860 passengers (6
persons per square meter), and the minimum headway hmin
between two successive trains is 90 s. The settings of relevant
parameters can be found in Table III.
TABLE III: Simulation Parameters
Parameters Value Parameters Value
hmin 90 hmax 600
ec 0.01 ef 0.01
Ω 3000 R 1500
Tp 1 θ 0.5 ∼ 0.8
By applying the proposed method, we obtain the optimal
departure frequency for each time period. The complicated
interactions between operator and passengers are analysed in
Fig. 2 and Fig. 3. In the first stage of the game, the operator
makes the optimal decision according to the passenger traffic.
Given departure frequency, the passengers choose their optimal
response in the second stage of the game. For example, as is
shown in Fig. 2, the optimal frequency is 24 times per hour
when the passenger traffic is 3× 104. Given the frequency to
be 24 times per hour, the optimal response of passengers is 70,
which is shown in Fig. 3. We choose 0.05 as the conversion
coefficient. Correspondingly, the fare that passengers would
like to pay is 3.5.
Fig. 4 shows the comparison between the current strategy
and the proposed optimal strategy. The proposed method can
improve the utility of operator by over 40.67% during rush
hours (passenger traffic is about 3 × 104) and 8.33% during
non-rush hours (passenger traffic is about 1× 104).
From the simulation results, we can see that our proposed
scheme has obvious advantages. This will not only meet
passengers’ demand, but also maximize operate income as well
as passengers’ quality of experience, and eventually improve
the systematic efficiency.
VI. CONCLUSION
The main contribution of this paper is applying Stackelberg
game theory to the dynamic decision-making process of de-
parture frequency. The aim is to alleviate the perceived conflict
between passengers’ and operator’s objectives. In detail, the
game is played as: the railway operator first sets its strategy,
i.e., an initial departure frequency, then the passengers choose
the best response strategy to maximize their utility. After
knowing the best response of passengers, operator resets its
strategy. In the model establishment and solving process, we
give the utility functions of both sides as the game model input
and obtain the closed form solutions to the game model output.
In addition, the proposed method is proved to be feasible and
efficient by the simulation works. The optimized departure
frequency can effectively improve the resource utilization, the
traffic efficiency and the QoE of passengers during rush hours
and non-rush hours.
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